We characterize, in the framework for variational preferences, the a¤ec-tive decision making model of choice under risk and uncertainty introduced by Bracha and Brown(2007) . This characterization (i) provides a rigorus decisiontheoretic foundation for a¤ective decision making, (ii) o¤ers an axiomatic explanation for ambiguity-seeking in the Ellsberg Paradox and (iii) suggests a dual representation of ADM games in terms of the Legendre-Fenchel conjugate.
Introduction
As is well known, the subjective expected utility (SEU) models of Savage (1954) and Anscombe and Aumann(1963) are refuted by the Ellsberg paradox (1961). In the Ellsberg experiment, individuals are asked to bet on a draw from an urn with 100 balls, some red and the rest black, where the distribution is unknown or bet on a draw from an urn with 50 black balls and 50 red balls. This experiment partitions the subjects into three disjoint groups: A, B, and C. Individuals in Group A preferred to bet on a black draw from the urn with the known distribution, rather than bet on a black draw from the urn with the unknown distribution and similarly for bets on drawing a red ball. Individuals in Group B, were indi¤erent between betting on draws from either urn. Individuals in Group C preferred to bet on the ambiguous urn.
In his thought experiment, Ellsberg (1961) on pg 651 suggests that the majority of people are in group A, but a small minority are in group C and he ignores the people in group B. As he points out, both Group A and C violate Savage's axioms for the SEU model. Subjects in Group A are said to be ambiguity-averse and subjects in Group C are said to be ambiguity-seeking.
A number of alternative models of choice under risk and uncertainty have been proposed as resolutions of the Ellsberg paradox, such as the maximin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) or more recently the multiplier preferences of Hansen and Sargent(2000) . Recently, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [MMR] (2006) proposed variational preferences as a general class of preferences that rationalize ambiguity-averse choices. MMR (2006) show that variational preferences subsume both maximin preferences and multiplier preferences and are characterized by six axioms, where axiom 5, due to Schmeidler (1989) , is the axiom for ambiguity aversion. This axiom has the simple geometric interpretation that the preference relation over acts is quasi-concave. Moreover, if axiom 5 is replaced by axiom 5 where the preference relation over acts is quasi-linear, then axioms :1 4, 5 and 6 characterize the SEU model. Both of these results are proven in MMR (2006) .
The remaining possibility is that the preference relation over acts is quasi-convexa possibility anticipated by Ellsberg's thought experiment (1961), where the decisionmakers in Group C were ambiguity-seeking. If so, then what is the behavioral interpretation of this axiom and do these preferences share with variational preferences a penalized SEU representation?
These are the questions we address in this paper.
In the variational preferences models the decision maker is playing a sequential game against a malevolent nature, where nature moves last. Hence the solution concept is maximin. In the a¤ective decision making (ADM) model proposed by Bracha and Brown (2007) the rational and the emotional process of the decision-maker are engaged in a simultaneous move, potential game, where the solution concept is Nash equilibrium. Both classes of models are penalized SEU models. In the variational preferences models the penalty re ‡ects the decision maker's uncertainty that her "subjective" beliefs about the states of the world are the correct state probabilities. In the ADM model, the penality re ‡ects the mental cost of her "optimistic" beliefs about preferred outcomes.
We suggest that the outcomes of Ellsberg's thought experiment are not paradoxical, but allow for three mutually exclusive formulations of Schmeidler's axiom. That is, preferences over acts can be quasi-concave, quasi-linear or quasi-convex. If in addition preferences satisfy axioms 1 4 and axiom 6 in MMR (2006), then the corresponding classes of preferences over acts are: variational preferences, SEU preferences and ADM preferences.We show that if axiom 5 : f s g =) f + (1 )g < f , the axiom that the preference relation over acts is quasi-concave, is replaced with axiom b 5: f s g =) f + (1 )g 4 f ,the axiom that the preference relation over acts is quasi-convex, then the preference relation has an ADM representation if and only if it satis…es axiom b 5 and axioms 1 4 and 6 for variational preferences.
In the next section, we use the proof in MMR (2006) of their representation theorem for variational preferences, with axiom b 5 in lieu of axiom 5, to prove the representation theorem for ADM preferences.
A Decision-Theoretic Foundation for ADM
We follow the SETUP in MMR(2006), where: S is the set of states of the world; is an algebra of subsets of S, the set of events; and X, the set of consequences, is a convex subset of some vector space. F is the set of (simple) acts, i.e., …nite-valued -measureable functions f : S ! X. B( ) is the set of all bounded -measureable functions. B( ) with the sup-norm is an AM -space with unit, the constant function 1. B o ( ) the set of -measureable simple functions is norm dense in B( ).The norm dual of B( ) is ba( ), …nitely additive signed measures of bounded variation onfor further discussion see chapter 13 in Aliprantis and Border(1999) 
Niveloids are functionals on function spaces that are monotone: ' =) I(') I( )and vertically invariant: I(' + r) = I(') + r for all ' and r 2 R-see Dolecki and Greco (1995) The general representation for variational preferences is:
is a convex functional on the simplex , the family of positive, …nitely additive measures of bounded variation in ba( ), and u is an a¢ ne function on X: If we rewrite V (f ) = min p2 R u(f )dp q(p) ; where q :
is a concave functional on the simplex ; then V (f ) is the Legendre-Fenchel conjugate of the concave function q(p)-see Rockafellar (1970) , pg 308; for …nite state spaces. If the decision-maker maximizes V (f ) over her choice set K, then max f 2K V (f ) = max f 2K min p2 R u(f )dp + c(p) . Hence her optimal decision is a maximin equilibrium of the game against nature.
The potential function, (f; p); for an ADM intrapersonal game is: (f; p) = R u(f )dp c(p), where c : 
(f; p). Hence arg max f 2K;p2 (f; p) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the ADM intrapersonal game. That is, maximax rather than maximin. Here are our axioms, again we follow MMR (2006) (
is a convex subset of B(M ) and by Schmeidlers's axiom 5, I is quasi-concave on . We also assume axioms1-4, so lemma 28 in MRR (2006) I is Lipshitz continuous. It follows from the theorem of the biconjugate for continuous, concave functionals that I(') = inf p2ba( ) n R 'dp b
where b I (p) = inf '2Bo( ) n R 'dp b I(') o is the concave, conjugate of b I(')-see Rockafellar (1970) , pg 308:for …nite state spaces. MMR(2006) show on pg. 1476 that we can restrict attention to , the family of positive, …nitely additive measures of bounded variation in ba( ). Hence I(') = min p2 n R 'dp b
J on B( ), using lemma 25 in MMR (2004), it follows from the theorem of the biconjugate for continuous, convex functionals that J(') = max p2ba( ) n R 'dp b
o is the convex, conjugate of b J(') -see Rockafellar (1970) , pg 104 for …nite state spaces and Z¼ alinescu (2002), pg 77 for in…nite state spaces.
Again it follows from MMR (2006) that J(') = max p2 n R 'dp b
Remark 2 The u in our representation theorem is a¢ ne.To obtain a concave u as assumed in Bracha and Brown (2007) , it may su¢ ce to consider some combination of axioms in Savage (1954) This dual representation has important, empirical implications for rationalizing market data with ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity-averse preferences. Here is the intutition for the dual representation. We restrict attention to …nite state spaces for ease of exposition.
Given the cost function c(p) de…ned on the simplex (R The
, where q i are the market prices and x i are the choices of the decision maker.
Theorem 3
If (x; p) = h ! u (x); pi c(p) is the potential function for an ADM game of Legendre type, then c ( ! u(x)) = (x; p(x)) is the optimal value function for the concave maximization problems of the rational process, parameterized by the best responses of the emotional process, where p(x) = (rc) 1 ( ! u (x)) is the best response of the emotional process, i.e., rc ( ! u(x)) = p(x).
Proof. c ( ! u (x)) = sup p2(R K ++ ) fh ! u (x); pi c(p)g = sup p2 (x; p). The …rst order condition for this maximization problem is rc(p) = ! u (x). If p(x) = (rc) 1 ( ! u (x)); then it follows from the envelope theorem that the optimal value function (x; p(x)) = c ( ! u (x)) = h ! u (x); p(x)i c(p(x)) is the upper envelope of the family of value functions for the concave maximization problems :
is the sup of a family of functions a¢ ne in ! u (x), hence convex in ! u (x). 
, where z w is the Hadamard product of z 2 (R K ) ++ and w 2 R K ++ :Hence r x J(u(x k )) = k q k for k = 1; 2; ::; N is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for each k, since x k is the best response of the rational process to p(x k ), the best response of the emotional process. Proof. This is the converse of Theorem 4, and follows from the theorem of the biconjugate, i.e., J(y) is the Legendre conjugate of J (p).
Theorem 6
If an ADM game is of Legendre type with potential function (x; p) = h ! u (x); pi c(p), then (x,p) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the ADM game if and only if c ( ! u (x)) + c(p) = h ! u (x); pi and r x c ( ! u (x)) = q, where q de…nes the decision maker's budget set
Proof. c ( ! u (x)) + c(p) = h ! u (x); pi if and only if rc(p) = ! u (x) and rc ( ! u (x)) = p -see Proposition 11:3 in Rockafellar and Wets (1998). rc ( ! u (x)) = p is the best response of the emotional process to ! u (x), the decision of the rational process. rc(p) = ! u (x) is the best response of the rational process to p, the decision of the emotional process, if r x c ( ! u (x)) = q. A similar analysis holds for variational preferences and concave cost functions of Legendre type.
Remark 7
The notion of risk aversion is problematic in the case of ambiguity-seeking decision makers, since J( ! u (x)) need not be concave in x, if J is convex in ! u (x).Consider the following examples of the composition of a convex function J and a concave function u; where J : R ++ ! R ++ and u : R ++ ! R ++ :(i) If J(y) = exp((1=2)y) and u(x) = ln(x), then (x) = J(u(x)) = x 1=2 (risk-averse) (ii)If J(y) = exp(y) and u(x) = ln(x), then (x) = J(u(x)) = x (risk-neutral) (iii)If J(y) = exp(2y) and u(x) = ln(x), then (x) = J(u(x)) = x 2 (risk-seeking). Of course, if J is a monotone concave funtion as is the case with SEU and variational preferences, then ! u (x) risk-averse in x implies J( ! u (x)) is risk-averse in x.
